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INTRODUCTION

In the 2003 case of Commonwealth v. Hudson,' the Supreme
Court of Virginia ruled that a criminal defendant must maintain the
same interpretation of the facts on appeal as she argued at trial.2
The supreme court held that although the facts may be subject to
more than one interpretation, a criminal defendant must argue on
appeal a "theory of innocence" consistent with that argued below.'
At his trial for the murder of his wife, Louis Scott Hudson argued
that his wife committed suicide.4 The jury rejected his interpretation
of the facts and convicted him of second degree murder.' In front of
the Court of Appeals of Virginia, Hudson argued that the facts could
be interpreted to show that he might have accidentally killed his
wife, or that she may have accidentally or intentionally killed
herself.' The court of appeals ruled that the Commonwealth failed
to disprove those additional theories of innocence and overturned
Hudson's conviction.' The Virginia Supreme Court subsequently
reinstated Hudson's conviction on the grounds that the court of
appeals erroneously considered a theory of innocence not presented
at Hudson's trial.' In accordance with Virginia Supreme Court Rule
5:25, which prohibits appellate courts from entertaining matters
raised for the first time on appeal,9 the court summarily dismissed
Hudson's new theory. °
The full implications of the seemingly innocuous rejection of a
criminal defendant's new "theory of innocence" have not been

1. 578 S.E.2d 781 (Va. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 972 (2003).
2. Id. at 786 ("Of course, upon appellate review, the issue of exclusion of reasonable
theories of innocence is limited to those theories advanced by the accused at trial.").
3. Id.
4. Id. at 783-86.
5. Id. at 782.
6. Hudson v. Commonwealth, No. 0917-01-4, 2002 WL 1554484, at *4 (Va. Ct. App. July
16, 2002).
7. Id.
8. Hudson, 578 S.E.2d at 786.
9. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:25. There are exceptions "for good cause shown or to enable [the]
Court to attain the ends of justice." Id.
10. Hudson, 578 S.E.2d at 786.
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explored by the Virginia appellate system.1 ' Quixotically, the
Hudson decision, which on its face seems to be staunchly antidefendant, could actually have far-reaching benefits for criminal
defendants in the Old Dominion. This Note argues that if criminal
defendants are prohibited by Hudson and the Virginia Supreme
Court's rules from presenting new theories of innocence on appeal,
the Commonwealth should likewise be prohibited from presenting
new theories of guilt or otherwise arguing the facts in a different
way than presented at the trial in which the defendant was
convicted.
Part I discusses a recent case in which the Virginia Supreme
Court permitted the Commonwealth to argue a new theory of guilt
on appeal. Part II addresses the treatment the Virginia appellate
system gives to theories of innocence proposed for the first time on
appeal by criminal defendants. Part III examines Virginia case law
and suggests that the Commonwealth should be prohibited from
raising new theories of guilt on appeal by analogizing the treatment
given to new factual theories presented on appeal both by criminal
defendants and in civil cases. Part IV balances the potential risks
and benefits of prohibiting new theories of guilt on appeal in
criminal cases. This Note concludes that the equity and integrity of
Virginia's criminal justice system would be significantly enhanced
by the requirement that the theory of guilt articulated by the
prosecution at trial must be the solitary interpretation of the facts
argued by the Commonwealth when a defendant appeals a conviction. To conclude otherwise is antagonistic to the adversarial system
of justice that underlies the entire American legal system.
I. BOLDEN V. COMMONWEALTH

12

On October 19, 2005, the Circuit Court for the City of Hampton
convicted Baraka S. Bolden of possession of a firearm while in
possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, possession of a
firearm after being declared a felon, and possession of a concealed

11. See infra Part II.B. The courts swiftly reject the new theory of innocence without
analyzing the consequences.
12. 654 S.E.2d 584 (Va. 2008).
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weapon.1 The trial court sentenced Bolden to a total of ten years in
prison. 4 Bolden appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed
his conviction. 15 He then appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia,
which granted him a writ of certiorari. 6
The facts of the case were never in significant dispute. Bolden
was sitting in the driver's seat of a vehicle parked in a hotel parking
lot early in the morning on February 10, 2005.'7 Another person sat
in the passenger's seat. 18 A police officer pulled into the parking lot
during a routine check of the premises.1 9 The vehicle in which
Bolden was sitting was parked "cockeyed" across several parking
spots, attracting the police officer's attention. 2' Bolden stepped out
of the vehicle as the police officer approached.2 1 When Bolden got
out of the vehicle, he dropped a one-inch square plastic baggie and
some rolling papers.2 2 The police officer looked at the bag and
"concluded it likely contained cocaine. '23 The officer then arrested
Bolden and searched his person, finding nearly six hundred dollars
in cash, a cell phone, and several bags of marijuana.2 4 A search of
the vehicle revealed a backpack containing more marijuana, a
digital scale, and more plastic baggies.25 The officer found a second
digital scale on the car's floorboard.2 6 Underneath the driver's seat
armrest, which was down, the officer found a handgun wrapped

13. Conviction Order dated October 19, 2005 (unpublished court order, on file with
author). Bolden was also convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Id. His sentences for these crimes were
suspended, and these convictions were not appealed. Sentencing Order dated December 22,
2005 (unpublished court order, on file with author).
14. Sentencing Order dated December 22, 2005 (unpublished court order, on file with
author).
15. Bolden v. Commonwealth, 640 S.E.2d 526, 528 (Va. Ct. App. 2007).
16. Brief of Appellant at 2, Bolden v. Commonwealth, No. 070816 (Va. Aug. 31, 2007).
17. Bolden, 654 S.E.2d at 585.
18. Id. at 585.
19. Transcript of Record at 17, Commonwealth v. Bolden, No. 070816 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct.
19, 2005).
20. Id. at 18.
21. Bolden v. Commonwealth, 640 S.E.2d 526, 528 (Va. Ct. App. 2007).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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inside of a plastic grocery bag. 27 Bolden was either "right beside ...
or ... sitting on [the handgun] ."28 The weapon inside the bag was
"hidden from common observation. 2 9
Because the handgun was not found on Bolden's person, the
Commonwealth's Attorney attempted to prove Bolden possessed
the weapon through "constructive possession."" In order to prove
constructive possession, "the Commonwealth must point to evidence
of acts, statements, or conduct of the accused or other facts or
circumstances which tend to show that the defendant was aware of
both the presence and character of the [handgun] and that it was
subject to his dominion and control."3 1 The Commonwealth's theory
of the case was that, due to his proximity to the weapon, Bolden
possessed the handgun found in the plastic bag stuffed between the

27.
28.
29.
30.

Transcript of Record, supra note 19, at 21.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 43.

31. Powers v. Commonwealth, 316 S.E.2d 739, 740 (Va. 1984) (discussing constructive

possession in the drug context). In Virginia, "[t]he principles that govern constructive
possession of illegal drugs also apply to constructive possession of a firearm." Grier v.
Commonwealth, 546 S.E.2d 743, 747-48 (Va. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Blake v. Commonwealth,
427 S.E.2d 219, 220-21 (Va. Ct. App. 1993)).
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driver's seat and the armrest." The trial court summarily convicted
Bolden. 3
Under Virginia's constructive possession case law, however,
"[m]ere proximity ... is insufficient to establish possession."34
Consequently, in his brief to the court of appeals, the Attorney
General abandoned the proximity theory of constructive possession,
instead arguing that because "firearms are a tool of the drug trade,
and ... the facts established [Bolden] was involved in the distribution of drugs, a reasonable inference followed that [Bolden possessed] the firearm .... , The court of appeals affirmed Bolden's
conviction based on this alternative theory of guilt,3" and the
32. The Commonwealth's theory was evident at several different points in the trial. In
response to Bolden's motion to strike the evidence, the Commonwealth's Attorney stated:
Your Honor, we believe that it was a constructive possession in this particular
case, which is proven typically through circumstantial evidence. The officer
testified that [the handgun] was in a blue Wal-Mart bag. However, it was on the
driver's seat. And the evidence showed that both [Bolden] and the passenger left
the vehicle at the same time ... The evidence showed ... that the firearm was
something of a nature when [the police officer] picked up the bag he immediately
knew the nature of what was in that bag. In addition ... the evidence showed
that-the officer testified that he believed that the firearm was positioned in the
seat in the nature as such the defendant had to either sit on it or he had to be
directly pressed against it.
Transcript of Record, supra note 19, at 43.
Earlier in the trial, the Commonwealth's Attorney examined a court-certified drug
distribution expert who testified, when describing the materials found in the vehicle, that
"[Bolden] has the weapon so he can protect his interests." Id. at 34, 37. Bolden's attorney
promptly objected, stating "I don't think that's meant as a conclusion that he possessed [the
handgun], just the fact that [the police officer] found [the handgun in the vehicle.]" Id. The
judge immediately accepted this objection, stating, "That's how I took it." Id. The
Commonwealth's Attorney then moved on with the examination, never again returning to
connect the drugs to the firearm. Id. at 37-38. In its brief to the Supreme Court of Virginia,
the Commonwealth all but conceded that the prosecuting attorney did not put forth the theory
of guilt relied upon on appeal. Brief of the Commonwealth at 12, Bolden v. Commonwealth,
No. 070816 (Va. Sept. 25, 2007). Rather, the Commonwealth argued "that the trial court, as
fact finder, was permitted to consider such a connection as a matter of law once the requisite
evidence of drug distribution was adduced at trial." Id. See infra Part IV.C. for further
discussion. For a detailed analysis of the evidence and argument regarding constructive
possession presented at trial, see Brief of the Commonwealth at 7-14, Bolden v.
Commonwealth, No. 070816 (Va. Aug. 31, 2007).
33. Conviction Order dated October 19, 2005, supra note 13.
34. Eckhart v. Commonwealth, 281 S.E.2d 853, 855 (Va. 1981).
35. Brief of the Commonwealth at 14, Bolden v. Commonwealth, No. 070816 (Va. Sept.
18, 2006) (citing Glasco v. Commonwealth, 497 S.E.2d 150, 156 (1998)).
36. Bolden v. Commonwealth, 640 S.E.2d 526, 530-31 (Va. Ct. App. 2007).
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Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. 37 Rather than directly address
whether the Commonwealth must maintain a consistent theory of
guilt when pressed by Bolden's attorney, 8 the supreme court simply
held that an appellate court's review is not limited to the evidence
and arguments mentioned by a party or the trial judge.39
By failing to restrict the Commonwealth on appeal to the original
theory of guilt employed at trial, the Virginia Supreme Court has
built uncorrectable error into the justice system in at least two
types of cases. The first type are cases like Bolden, in which the
prosecution's trial argumentation simply fails to meet the required
elements for judicially-created doctrines like constructive possession, but where the facts may have supported such a finding if
correctly argued. The second type is more theoretical. Consider the
situation where a prosecutor presents his theory of the facts at trial
and the defendant effectively refutes each element of the prosecutor's theory. Under Bolden, the trial court could still convict the
defendant because it finds the defendant guilty under a second, and
entirely different, theory of the facts. What makes these errors
uncorrectable after Bolden is the fact that, on appeal, the Commonwealth is allowed to rework a facially insufficient case, yet the
defendant never has an opportunity to present facts or arguments
in response because Virginia's appellate procedural rules4 ° and the
Supreme Court's decision in Hudson4 restrict her to what she
argued at trial.
In the first type of case, in which the facts may or may not be
fairly interpreted to meet the doctrinal requirements, the Commonwealth may completely recast the facts and arguments to meet those
elements. In the second type of case, a clever appellate counsel could
deduce the alternate theory of guilt utilized by the judge to convict
the defendant, and present that theory on appeal as the reason to
uphold the defendant's conviction. Even more troubling is that when
the Commonwealth retools its theory of guilt, it is given the
enormous benefits of having its theory viewed in the light most
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Bolden v. Commonwealth, 654 S.E.2d 584, 584 (Va. 2008).
Brief of Appellant, supra note 16, at 15-18.
Bolden, 654 S.E.2d at 586. See infra Part IV.C for further discussion of this concept.
See infra Part 11A.
Commonwealth v. Hudson, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786 (Va. 2003).
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favorable to it, 42 and is accorded "all inferences fairly deducible from

the evidence" on appeal. 43 The Virginia Supreme Court's holding in
Bolden allows a criminal defendant to be convicted based on an
argument never vocalized at trial, to which she never has an
opportunity to reply, and then allows the Commonwealth on appeal
to articulate and rely solely on that argument as a reason for
upholding the conviction.
II. NEW THEORIES OF INNOCENCE
A. Appellate ProceduralRules
In Virginia criminal cases, appellate procedural rules 5:25 and
5A:18 prohibit defendants from raising arguments not presented at
trial. 4 Although framed in terms of responding to objections, Rules
5A:18 and 5:25 are not "applicable only to evidentiary and similar
rulings"45 but to all 'legal decisions and findings. '46 The rules
mandate that "[e]rror will not be sustained to any ruling of the trial
court or the commission before which the case was initially tried
unless the objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the

42. Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 645 S.E.2d 433, 433 (Va. 2007).
43. Riner v. Commonwealth, 601 S.E.2d 555, 558 (Va. 2004). See infraPart IV for a more
detailed analysis of these concerns.
44. Rule 5:25 reads as follows:
Error will not be sustained to any ruling of the trial court or the commission
before which the case was initially tried unless the objection was stated with
reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to
enable this Court to attain the ends of justice.
VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:25.

Rule 5A:18 is 5:25's corollary for the Virginia Court of Appeals. Rule 5A:18 reads:
No ruling of the trial court ... will be considered as a basis for reversal unless
the objection was stated together with the grounds therefor at the time of the
ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable the Court of Appeals to attain
the ends of justice. A mere statement that the judgment or award is contrary to
the law and the evidence is not sufficient to constitute a question to be ruled
upon on appeal.
VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:18.

Rules 5A.18 and 5:25 should be interpreted to have essentially the same meaning. Lee v.
Lee, 404 S.E.2d 736, 738 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (en banc).
45. Lee, 404 S.E.2d at 738.
46. Id. (citing a "myriad of cases" that support this holding).
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time of the ruling ...
."4 The wording of these rules, therefore,
presupposes that factual questions are to be resolved at the trial
level. The rules allow for the review of instances in which defense
counsel objects, prompting the trial judge to apply a rule of law. It
is under this rubric that new theories of innocence are prohibited,
despite the fact that the rules only specifically refer to instances
when the trial court has made a "ruling."48
The logic behind the rules is simple and is reflected in the
"contemporaneous objection rule."49 Requiring trial attorneys to
bring error to the attention of the trial judge at the time the error
is committed gives the judge an opportunity to correct the error, or
mitigate its harms.5 ° The contemporaneous objection rule thus
promotes judicial economy in several ways. It protects the parties
from the needless burden of a costly appeal,5 1 promotes "efficient
judicial administration"5 2 by guarding against reversals and
mistrials, 53 and prevents attorneys from building error into the trial
record.54
More importantly, the contemporaneous objection rule preserves
essential fairness by protecting a party from an argument that could
be raised against it at trial, but is not.55 This rule prevents an
appealing party from asking for a reversal based on an error not
brought to the attention of the trial court at the time it was made.
Doing so "is unfair to the opposing party, who may have been able
to offer an alternative to the objectionable ruling, but did not do so,

47. VA. SuP. CT. R. 5:25.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Henry v. Mississippi, 397 U.S. 443, 450 (1965).
50. "The goal of the contemporaneous objection rule is to avoid unnecessary appeals,
reversals and mistrials by allowing the trial judge to intelligently consider an issue and, if
necessary, to take corrective action." Campbell v. Commonwealth, 405 S.E.2d 1, 2 (Va. Ct.
App. 1991) (en banc) (citing Head v. Commonwealth, 348 S.E.2d 423,426 (Va. Ct. App. 1986)).
51. And in civil cases, the rule protects against the possibility of an expensive retrial. Lee,
394 S.E.2d at 491.
52. Id.
53. See Woodson v. Commonwealth, 176 S.E.2d 818, 820-21 (Va. 1970) (citing Reil v.
Commonwealth, 171 S.E.2d 162, 164 (Va. 1969)).
54. Keecher's Adm'r v. Richmond, Fredricksburg & Potomac R.R. Co., 142 S.E. 393, 395
(Va. 1928).
55. Lee, 394 S.E.2d at 491.
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believing there was no problem."5 6 Defendants cannot advocate a
new theory of innocence because Virginia Supreme Court and Court
of Appeals rules, and the case law interpreting those rules, require
the appellant to object to some ruling of the lower court in order
for there to be something to review.5 7 That Virginia appellate rules
5A:18 and 5:25 act in this fashion makes sense as a practical
matter. The prevailing party below rarely appeals, 5 and the losing
party often would like to raise new issues to bolster their trial
argumentation.5 9
B. Virginia Case Law
Virginia case law is replete with examples in which a criminal
defendant attempted to raise a new theory of innocence on appeal.
In Kelly v. Commonwealth, ° the court of appeals upheld convictions
for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and for
importing narcotics into Virginia.61 The issues in Kelly were whether
56. Id. Rules 5A:18 and 5:25 contain two exemptions to allow appellate courts to entertain
new arguments "for good cause shown or to enable this Court to attain the ends of justice ....
"
VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:18, 5:25. For various reasons outside the scope of this Note, these
exceptions do not justify a new theory of guilt or innocence. Essentially, the Commonwealth
is constitutionally prohibited from appealing a finding of innocence, see infra note 59, while
with criminal defendants, the failure to raise a theory of innocence is not considered a
miscarriage ofjustice. Ryan v. Commonwealth, 247 S.E.2d 698,703 (Va. 1978) (citing VA. Sup.
CT. R. 5:21, the predecessor to today's Rule 5:25).
57. See, e.g., VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:18, 5:25; Taylor v. Commonwealth, 157 S.E.2d 185, 191
(Va. 1967).
58. The Commonwealth never appeals in criminal trials due to the Fifth Amendment's
Double Jeopardy provisions. See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 64 (1978) ("Thus
when a defendant has been acquitted at trial he may not be retried on the same offense, even
if the legal rulings underlying the acquittal were erroneous."); see also Tibbs v. Florida, 457
U.S. 31, 40-42 (1982); Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 666-71 (1896). For a review of
instances when the Commonwealth of Virginia may appeal in criminal proceedings, see
Deborah Lee Titus, Note, Commonwealth Right of Appeal in CriminalProceedings,43 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 295 (1986).
59. This new argumentation in criminal cases could come either in the form of a new
theory of innocence or a new rationale supporting an objection raised at trial. For an example
of a new theory of innocence rejected on appeal, see Commonwealth v. Hudson, 578 S.E.2d
781, 786 (Va. 2003); see also Goins v. Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d 114, 128 (Va. 1996) (denying
a defendant the ability to raise a new rationale on appeal to support an objection made at
trial).
60. 584 S.E.2d 444 (Va. Ct. App. 2003) (en banc).
61. Id. at 445-46.
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the defendant knew the drugs were in the vehicle, and whether the
drugs were acquired at the restaurant at which he was arrested or
instead had been purchased in Maryland.62 The trial court specifically held that Kelly did know that the packages contained marijuana when he was arrested,63 and that "the evidence is clear that
[Kelly] was coming from Maryland."' Because the trial court made
these specific findings, the Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, easily
rejected Kelly's "alternative hypothesis of innocence" that the
drugs were picked up in Virginia at the restaurant where Kelly
was arrested.6 5 Specifically, the Kelly court held that "whether an
'alternative hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is a question of
fact and, therefore, is binding on appeal unless plainly wrong."'66
Although Kelly presented his "alternative hypothesis" of innocence
at trial, the case falls within the scope of this Note because it lays
the logical foundation for rejecting new defendant theories of
innocence on appeal.
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected a new theory of inno6 7 Lyons was convicted of driving
cence in Lyons v. City of Petersburg.
6
8
under the influence of alcohol. At trial, the arresting officer
testified that "Mr. Lyons had run into a parked car ....
Lyons was
found sitting in his car near the parked car, which had been thrown
forward about twenty-five feet from its previously parked position.7 °
On appeal, Lyons claimed that the police officer did not testify as to
how he determined Lyons was driving the vehicle when the accident occurred,7 1 as opposed to simply sitting in the car after the

62. Id. at 447-48 & n.2.
63. Id. at 447.
64. Id. (brackets in original).
65. Id. at 448 (quotation omitted).
66. Id. (quoting Stevens v. Commonwealth, 567 S.E.2d 537, 540 (Va. Ct. App. 2002)).
Within this holding is the inherent assumption that for a question of fact to be binding on an
appellate court, it must have been considered by the trial court. See infra Part IV.A for a
further elaboration of this point.
67. 266 S.E.2d 880, 881-82 (Va. 1980) (per curiam).
68. Id. at 880.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 880-81.
71. There was also a second person found in Lyons's car when the police officer arrived,
and, presumably, Lyons's argument at trial and on appeal was that this person was just as
likely to be the driver as he was. Id. at 881.
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accident.7 2 Although the Virginia Supreme Court had no problem
inferring from the officer's testimony and other facts that Lyons was
the driver,73 the court also found it incumbent upon Lyons's trial
counsel to point out that the officer failed to provide specific reasons
for how he concluded that Lyons was the driver.74 Because Lyons
failed to flesh out these specific reasons and present his alternate
theory at trial, the court prohibited him from raising these points
for the first time on appeal.75 Although the Virginia Supreme Court
did not cite Rule 5:25 in this particular opinion, it is clear that the
Virginia Supreme Court exercised its power to reject a new theory
of innocence proffered for the first time on appeal.
In Wise v. Commonwealth,7" Wise was convicted of capital murder
in the commission of armed robbery.77 On appeal, Wise attempted
to argue a new theory of innocence, proclaiming that the evidence
did not show he was in "exclusive possession" of the pickup truck he
was convicted of stealing.7" Citing Rule 5:25, the Virginia Supreme
Court refused to hear his argument, saying, "The defendant did not
raise that ground for the trial court's consideration, and he cannot
assert it for the first time in this Court. 79

72. Id.
73. Id. at 881 ("It strains one's credulity to believe that the accident involved here
happened other than in the manner claimed by the City. There is no other reasonable
explanation for the scene which the officer found .... ").
74. Id. at 882. Unlike trial counsel in Lyons, the trial attorney in Bolden specifically
objected to an unwarranted assertion by a police detective that Bolden possessed the gun
found in the vehicle in which he was sitting. Transcript of Record, supra note 19, at 37. The
trial judge agreed with the objection, holding that the testimony would only be considered for
the fact that a gun was found in the car. See supra note 32. The difference in the two cases is
that in Lyons it was the defense attempting to supplement an ineffective trial court argument,
whereas in Bolden, the Commonwealth successfully supplemented their trial court argument
with an additional theory of guilt on appeal. Whether this distinction makes a difference or
is susceptible to a "right for the wrong reason" exception will be discussed infra Part III.C.
75. Lyons, 266 S.E.2d at 882.
76. 337 S.E.2d 715 (Va. 1985).
77. Id. at 717.
78. Id. at 722.
79. Id.
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In an unreported 2004 case,' the defendant was convicted of
driving after having been adjudicated an habitual offender.8 1 At
trial, the Commonwealth evidenced and argued that the defendant
"knew his license had been revoked as an habitual offender., 82 At
trial, the defendant argued "only that [he] did not have actual notice
of his habitual offender status."' On appeal, the defense asserted a
new theory of innocence-namely that the defendant lied to the
DMV and to the police officer because he was "motivated by his
prior suspended license convictions, rather than any actual
knowledge of his habitual offender status."' The appellate court
swiftly rejected this theory saying, "At trial, [the defendant] never
mentioned the suspended-license hypothesis as an alternative
explanation for the false statements .."" Citing Hudson, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the conviction.'
The defendant in Hogan v. Commonwealth8 7 attempted to question the verity of a photographic lineup for the first time on appeal.8 8
Hogan had failed to object to the problematic identification at trial.8 9
During his appeal, Hogan argued that the victim's identification of
him was faulty because the lineups were improperly performed.'
Because Hogan failed to raise this theory at trial or obtain a ruling
from the trial court as to the admissibility of the lineup evidence,
the appellate court quickly disposed of this argument, relying on
Rule 5A:18."'
Like new theories of innocence, new procedural arguments by
criminal defendants receive the same unfriendly treatment by the

80. Bolden v. Commonwealth, No. 0500-03-4, 2004 WL 2706338 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 30,
2004). It should be noted that this defendant "Bolden" is not the same "Bolden" discussed in
the 2008 Virginia Supreme Court case.
81. Id. at *1.
82. Id.
83. Id. at *2.
84. Id. at *3.
85. Id.
86. Id. at **3-4 (citing Commonwealth v. Hudson, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786 (Va. 2003)).
87. 360 S.E.2d 371 (Va. Ct. App. 1987).
88. Id. at 376.
89. Id. at 373-74.
90. Id. at 376.
91. Id.
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3 the
Virginia appellate system.9 2 In Commonwealth v. Jenkins,"
Supreme Court of Virginia reinstated two convictions previously
reversed by the court of appeals.9 4 The court had reversed the
convictions because it disregarded handwriting on a document that
incriminated Jenkins.95 Notably, the defense had not objected to the
introduction of this evidence at trial.9 6 The handwriting was from a
doctor who had examined the victim and stated that the victim died
from aspiration, which resulted from the gunshot wound inflicted by
Jenkins.9 7 The supreme court found the court of appeals erred in
disregarding this evidence, noting that "[w]hen Jenkins' counsel
offered the document into evidence, he did not request that the
handwritten notation be excluded ....
Thus ...
Jenkins has waived
any later objection to its consideration by the trier of fact."98
Jenkins's appellate counsel argued a new procedural argument, 99
and a new theory of innocence,"' both of which the Virginia
Supreme Court denied because of their newness."'

92. See supra Part II.A. For a criticism of the overuse of procedural default in denying
capital appeals in Virginia, see Matthew K. Mahoney, Note, Bridgingthe ProceduralDefault
Chasm, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 305 (2000).
93. 499 S.E.2d 263 (Va. 1998).
94. Id. at 266. Jenkins v. Commonwealth, No. 1093-96-1, 1997 WL 290199 (Va. Ct. App.
June 3, 1997).
95. Jenkins, 499 S.E.2d at 265. The court of appeals stated in a footnote:
We acknowledge that one of the exhibits, Jackson's typewritten discharge
summary which is signed by Dr. Carney, contains an almost indecipherable
handwritten note in the top left corner: "many Factors contributed to his death
but all were result of Gunshot wound." There is no indication in the record of the
source or author of this handwritten note and neither party acknowledged the
note in its brief. Consequently, we can only speculate as to its origin,
authenticity, and authorship, and we are constrained by the record before us to
disregard it.
Jenkins, 1997 WL 290199, at *2 n.1.
96. Jenkins, 499 S.E.2d at 264.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 266 (citing VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:25).
99. The new procedural argument was objecting to the handwritten evidence. Id. at 264.
100. Specifically, the new theory of innocence was that the aspiration was caused by a
seizure not the gunshot wound. Id. at 264-65. In response, the Commonwealth successfully
argued in this case that "even if [the victim] had a seizure prior to his death, such an
intervening event would not exonerate Jenkins because any such seizure would have been 'put
into operation' by Jenkins' acts." Id. at 265.
101. Id. at 266.
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Virginia appellate courts also use Rules 5A:18 and 5:25 to reject
statutory defenses brought by criminal defendants for the first time
on appeal. In Jacques v. Commonwealth,1 2 Jacques's trial counsel
contested the search of his vehicle on constitutional grounds. °3 On
appeal, however, Jacques supplemented his appeal by arguing that
a Virginia Code section "proscribed the search of his car.""0 4 In rejecting Jacques's new argument, the court said that "[t]he appellant's motion to suppress was based on constitutional grounds. We
will not consider this issue for the first time on appeal."'0 5
The prohibition on new argumentation extends through factual,
procedural, and statutory arguments to new constitutional claims.
In Connelly v. Commonwealth, 06 the defendant was charged with
possession of a controlled substance, but a finding of guilt was
withheld for a period of one year in accordance with Virginia's First
Offender statute.0 7 During the one-year period, Connelly tested
positive for marijuana.' 8 Notwithstanding the probation officer's
recommendation to the contrary, the court convicted Connelly of
her original offense. 109 On appeal, Connelly "contend[ed] that the
dispositional proceedings violated her 'due process rights.""'0 The
court of appeals, citing Rule 5A:18, rejected this new argument
stating that even with constitutional questions, the "trial judge
[must] be given the first opportunity to rule ..

102. 405 S.E.2d 630 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
103. Id. at 631.
104. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-83 (repealed 1994)).
105. Id. (citing VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:18).
106. 420 S.E.2d 244 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
107. Id. at 245. Virginia's First Offender statute maybe found at VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-251
(West 2008).
108. Connelly, 420 S.E.2d at 245.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 245-46 (citing Gardner v. Commonwealth, 350 S.E.2d 229, 232 (Va. Ct. App.
1986)) (internal quotation omitted). Additionally, the United States Supreme Court ruled that
arguments to which a procedural default would apply in state courts apply in federal courts
for the purposes of habeas corpus proceedings, meaning Rules 5A:18 and 5:25 will prevent a
criminal defendant from being able to raise new arguments in habeas proceedings based on
Virginia state convictions. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977); see also Mahoney,
supra note 92, at 306-07.
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C. Commonwealth v. Hudson
The most significant case with respect to the ability of defendants to raise a new theory of innocence on appeal is the 2003
case of Commonwealth v. Hudson."2 The Virginia Court of Appeals
overturned Hudson's murder conviction on the grounds that "the
Commonwealth's evidence fail[ed] to exclude all reasonable hypotheses of innocence."" 3 The court reasoned that when "the proof relied
upon by the Commonwealth is wholly circumstantial, as it here
[was], then to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt all necessary circumstances proved must be consistent with guilt and
inconsistent with innocence.""' 4 The court allowed Hudson to argue
that "Mrs. Hudson did not die through the criminal agency of
another""' 5 and that "the evidence failed to exclude the reasonable
conclusion that Mrs. Hudson was fatally shot by accident or
intentionally by her own act."" 6 The court then reviewed the
evidence"' and found that "[t]here [was] simply no evidence
establishing Hudson ever touched the weapon that fired the fatal
bullet. Yet there [was] some evidence that Mrs. Hudson may have
fatally fired the gun." 1 8 The court thus concluded that "[t]he
evidence in the instant case fail[ed] to prove [Hudson's] guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.""19

112. 578 S.E.2d 781 (Va. 2003).
113. Hudson v. Commonwealth, No. 0917-01-4, 2002 WL 1554484, at *4 (Va. Ct. App. July
16, 2002).
114. Id. at *3 (quoting Clodfelter v. Commonwealth, 238 S.E.2d 820, 822 (1977)).
115. Id. at *4.
116. Id.
117. The Court of Appeals specifically considered:
The .22 revolver that fired the fatal shot was found in Mrs. Hudson's hand. The
expert evidence demonstrated that the gunshot residue found on Mrs. Hudson's
right hand was consistent with the .22 shells at the scene. The gunshot residue
evidence further showed the residue found on Hudson's hands was not
consistent with that ammunition. In addition, there were no identifiable
fingerprints found on the .22 revolver or any of the cartridges attributable to
Hudson.
Id. at *4.
118. Id.
119. Id. at *4-5.
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Citing Rules 5A:18 and 5:25, the Supreme Court of Virginia
reversed the court of appeals and reinstated Hudson's convictions. 2 °
The supreme court admonished the court of appeals for considering
the additional "reasonable hypotheses of innocence"'' not offered at
trial, saying:
Of course, upon appellate review, the issue of exclusion of
reasonable theories of innocence is limited to those theories
advanced by the accused at trial. Subject to the ends of justice
exception, appellate courts will not entertain matters raised for
the first time on appeal ....
In the case before us, Hudson did not

testify at trial; however, many of his pretrial statements were
introduced through other witnesses. Hudson's theory of innocence was advanced in counsel's argument to the jury.
Hudson argued only that [his wife] committed suicide. He did
not advance a theory of accidental shooting by [his wife] or by
himself. He did not advance a theory that the fatal shot was
fired by someone other than [his wife]. In closing argument,
counsel stated to the jury, "Tragically, tragically, suicide is the
only reasonable explanation of what happened on September
20th, 1999." Emphasizing the circumstantial nature of the evidence and the presumption122of innocence, Hudson maintained
that [his wife] shot herself.

With this statement, the supreme court unquestionably confirmed
that Virginia Supreme Court Rules 5A:18 and 5:25 prohibit a
criminal defendant from pursuing a theory of innocence on appeal
that was not raised in the trial court, even if the facts introduced at
trial are susceptible to such an interpretation.'2 3 In the 2008 Bolden
decision, the Supreme Court rejected an opportunity to apply this
same principle to124new theories of guilt on appeal presented by the
Commonwealth.

120. Commonwealth v. Hudson, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786-88 (Va. 2003).
121. Id. at 785 (quotation omitted).
122. Id. at 786 (citation omitted).
123. That the facts in Hudson were susceptible to such an alternate explanation can be
inferred from the ease with which the Court of Appeals accepted them, apparently without
even considering whether it was necessary that they be raised before the trial court.
124. See supra Part I.
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D. ComparisonBetween New Theories of Innocence and Guilt
This Note does not take issue with Virginia appellate courts
applying procedural default rules strictly to prevent criminal
defendants from raising new theories of innocence, procedural
arguments, statutory claims, or constitutional defenses. This Part
contrasts the application of the procedural default rules to new
theories of innocence raised by criminal defendants with the
treatment given to new theories of guilt proffered by the Commonwealth on appeal. In the cases discussed above, the defendants' new
contentions were hardly given a passing mention before being
summarily dismissed.'25 When the Commonwealth attempts to
present new theories of guilt on appeal to preserve a criminal
conviction, in contravention of the maxim that "appellate courts will
not entertain matters raised for the first time on appeal,"'2 6 Virginia
appellate courts often go to great lengths to consider the new
theories.'2 7 One appellate court went so far in one instance to say
that "the Commonwealth is not subject to the provisions of Rule[s
5A:18 and 5:25].'28 Indeed, all Virginia appellate courts so hold, in
spite of the claim that they "consistently have applied [Rules 5A: 18
129
and 5:25] in both civil and criminal cases ....
Perhaps, however, these two comments are not actually inconsistent. Perhaps "consistently" means that the Virginia Supreme Court
has "consistently" applied procedural default rules to criminal
defendants, while "consistently" not subjecting the Commonwealth
to the same strictures. This Note argues that this uneven application of rules 5A:18 and 5:25 should be changed. A truly just
appellate system would prohibit criminal defendants from presenting new theories of innocence on appeal, while also limiting the
Commonwealth to the theory of guilt it presented at trial. An
appellate system that limits criminal defendants to the theory of
innocence presented at trial while allowing the Commonwealth to
present theories of guilt above and beyond those presented at trial

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See supraPart II.B-C.
Hudson, 578 S.E.2d at 786.
See infra Part III.B.
Mason v. Commonwealth, 373 S.E.2d 603, 607 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
Jimenez v. Commonwealth, 402 S.E.2d 678, 680 (Va. 1991).
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is literally unbalanced-the scales of justice are tipped against
criminal defendants from the beginning.
The legitimate procedural advantages that the Commonwealth
has on appeal-particularly the ability to have the facts viewed in
the light most favorable to itI 3°-and the appropriate procedural
disadvantages to which criminal defendants are subject-specifically Rules 5A:18 and 5:25-allowing the Commonwealth to
present a new theory of guilt on appeal effectively allow the
Commonwealth to construct an incredibly damaging version of the
facts to which the defendant cannot respond.' When the Commonwealth can advocate a new theory of guilt with the added benefits
of being granted all reasonable inferences from the facts132 and
having the facts viewed in the light most favorable to it,"' what may
have been an arguable interpretation of the facts at trial can become
an unbeatable theory of guilt on appeal. Because Rules 5A:18 and
5:25 prevent a defendant from raising new factual interpretations
on appeal to combat a new theory of guilt, her only possible reply is
to argue that the Commonwealth's new theories should likewise be
procedurally barred. By failing to use Rule 5:25 to bar the Commonwealth from presenting new theories of guilt on appeal with its
decision in Bolden,' the Virginia Supreme Court has only further
entrenched the Commonwealth's ability to manipulate this imbalance.
The Virginia Supreme Court likely did not intend the procedural
scenario just described. More plausibly, the imbalance is a procedural irregularity that has resulted from the fact that the cases
interpreting Rules 5A: 18 or 5:25 never look at the rules as applying
to both the Commonwealth and the criminal defendant at the same
time.'3 5 Regardless, the Virginia Supreme Court should seize the
next opportunity to restore equity in Virginia's appellate system by
holding that Rule 5:25136 bars new theories of guilt proffered by the
130. Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (Va. 1975).
131. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
132. Higginbotham, 218 S.E.2d at 537.
133. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Hudson, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786 (Va. 2003).
134. Bolden v. Commonwealth, 654 S.E.2d 584, 584-87 (Va. 2008).
135. Unlike civil cases, in criminal cases only one party can appeal, not both. Driscoll v.
Commonwealth, 417 S.E.2d 312,313 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (prohibiting the Commonwealth from
arguing a cross-appeal in criminal cases).
136. And by extension, Rule 5A:18.
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Commonwealth, just as it bars new theories of innocence argued for
the first time on appeal by criminal defendants.
III. NEW THEORIES OF GUILT
A. New Arguments on Appeal in Civil Cases
Although the Virginia Supreme Court failed specifically to extend
Hudson 3 7 and the prohibitions contained in Rules 5A:18 and 5:25
3 8 the Virginia
to new Commonwealth theories of guilt in Bolden,"
case law supports such an extension. The argument that Rules
5A:18 and 5:25 should apply only to criminal defendants during
appeals stems from the fact that the language of the rules restricts
only "appellants."'39 The Commonwealth is constitutionally barred
from appealing a finding of innocence, 4 ° making the rules facially
applicable only to criminal defendants. The application of rules
5A: 18 and 5:25 in the context of civil appeals, however, makes clear
that the rules' prohibitions should apply to both parties in criminal
litigation.
In West Alexandria Properties,Inc. v. First Virginia Mortgage &
Real EstateInvestment Trust' the Virginia Supreme Court applied
its customary strict interpretation of Rule 5:25, stating, "On appeal,
though taking the same general position as in the trial court, an
appellant may not rely on reasons which could have been but were
not raised for the benefit of the lower court.' 4 2 Therefore, Rule 5:25
applies in the same fashion to civil appellants as it does to criminal
appellants. However, because of the nature of civil litigation, often
both parties will have issues they would like to appeal. In civil
appeals, Rule 5:25 applies equally to prohibit appellants from
raising new arguments on appeal, just as it does to appellees who
attempt to argue new theories, arguments, or rationales on
appeal.'4 3
137. Hudson, 578 S.E.2d at 786.
138. Bolden, 654 S.E.2d at 586.
139. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:18; 5:25.
140. See supra note 58.
141. 267 S.E.2d 149 (Va. 1980).
142. Id. at 151 (citing Rule 5:21, now Rule 5:25).
143. See Langley v. Meredith, 376 S.E.2d 519, 522-23 (Va. 1989) (relying on Rule 5:25 to
reject an appellee's attempt to assign cross-errors on appeal that were not raised at trial);
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Prior to being elevated to Chief Justice, then-Justice Hassell
wrote in an impassioned dissent, 'This Court has an obligation to
apply its procedural rules impartially and uniformly to all litigants.
Uniform application of procedural rules, regardless of the status of
the litigant who appears before the bar of this Court, is an indispensable component of justice."' 4 Although this comment was made
in the context of an appellant's failure to assign properly an error
upon which the supreme court eventually ruled,'4 5 the implication
cannot be missed. The soon-to-be Chief Justice of the Virginia
Supreme Court felt that the rules of the court should apply to all
litigants regardless of their economic or social position, whether
their case is civil or criminal, and regardless of their status as
appellant or appellee. Again dissenting, this time in a criminal case,
Chief Justice Hassell wrote:
The Commonwealth asserts its procedural bar argument for the
first time in this Court, after Buck's appeal had been awarded.
The Commonwealth should not be permitted to do so. In essence,
the Commonwealth is permitted to play "fast and loose" with the
Court of Appeals and this Court .... I am not aware of any other
appeal from the Court of Appeals in which this court has
permitted an appellant to raise a procedural bar that is not
jurisdictional when the bar was not raised in the Court of
Appeals.14
It is precisely to prevent the Commonwealth from playing "fast and
loose"'47 with the Virginia appellate system that the Commonwealth

Harbour Gate Owners' Ass'n v. Berg, 348 S.E.2d 252, 259 (Va. 1986) (citing Rule 5:25 to
disallow an appellee's arguments raised for the first time on appeal); see also Reid v.
Baumgardner, 232 S.E.2d 778, 780-81 (Va. 1977).
144. Taylor v. Worrell Enters., 409 S.E.2d 136, 140 (Va. 1991) (Hassell, J., dissenting).
145. Id.
146. Buck v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 414, 418 (Va. 1994) (Hassell, J., dissenting). It
should be noted that while Chief Justice Hassell refers to the Commonwealth as the
"appellant" in this quote, the defendant Buck was actually the appellant. Buck's conviction
had been overturned by the court of appeals, after which it was reinstated by the court of
appeals sitting en banc. Buck then appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Virginia.
Id. at 414-15.
147. Id. at 418.
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should be prohibited from arguing a new theory of guilt on appeal
that it did not present at trial.'48
B. Criminal Cases
On appeal, theories of innocence and guilt are reviewed under the
familiar standard that appellate courts do not act as fact-finder, but
rather evaluate whether "any rational trier of fact could have found
the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."'4 9 This may
seem to be a mundane matter. However, continuing on appeal the
theory of guilt espoused at trial gives the respective courts of appeal
the ability to review the trial courts' rationales for finding the
elements of the crimes charged. The fundamental principle is that
in order for the trial court argumentation to be given the deferential
appellate review inherent in the "any rational trier of fact"'5
standard, that theory of guilt must actually have been presented at
trial.
A corollary here is that when a theory of guilt sufficient to meet
the elements of the crime charged is espoused at trial, and that
theory is the one under which the defendant is convicted, the
evidence at trial must actually support the theory presented. In
Crowder v. Commonwealth,'5 ' the defendant was convicted of felony
destruction of crops when he "did donuts" in a patch of farmland.'5 2
The Commonwealth argued at trial that the value of the crops
destroyed was greater than the minimum amount required to attain
a felony conviction.'5 3 The court of appeals reversed the conviction
because the section of testimony relied upon by the Commonwealth
and the trial court in finding the statutory minimum was met did
not actually contain the monetary value of the crops destroyed.'54 By
reading Crowder together with cases like Haskins and Barnes, the
148. For a discussion of the dangers inherent in allowing new theories of guilt on appeal,
see infra Part IV.B.
149. Haskins v. Commonwealth, 602 S.E.2d 402, 405 (Va. Ct. App. 2004) (quotation
omitted); see also Barnes v. Commonwealth, 622 S.E.2d 278, 279-80 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
150. Haskins, 602 S.E.2d at 405.
151. 588 S.E.2d 384 (Va. Ct. App. 2003).
152. Id. at 385-86.
153. Id. at 386-88. Crowder was convicted of felony destruction of property in excess of
$1000. Id. at 386.
154. Id. at 387-88.
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Virginia case law clearly shows that not only must the defendant be
presented with the theory of guilt under which the Commonwealth
seeks conviction, but the Commonwealth must also provide the
evidence necessary to support the asserted theory of guilt. The
Virginia Court of Appeals should reverse any conviction involving
a defendant convicted under a theory of guilt that does not fit the
elements of the crime charged or when the evidence is insufficient
to support a theory of guilt that matches the elements of the crime
charged.
C. 'Right for the Wrong Reason"
In criminal cases, "Rule 5A:18 [or 5:251 does not require an
appellee to raise an issue at trial before it may be considered on
appeal where the issue is not offered to support the reversal of a
15 Stated more bluntly, "the Commonwealth is
trial court ruling.""
not subject to the provisions of Rule 5A: 18 [and 5:25] '' 16 because in
a criminal appeal the Commonwealth is always arguing to affirm
the conviction below. Rules 5:25 and 5A:18, therefore, do not apply
because of the judicially created "right for the wrong reason"
rationale. This rationale states that
[a]n appellate court cannot vacate a criminal conviction that
violates no recognizable legal principle simply on the ground
that the prosecutor (or, for that matter, the trial judge) did not
articulate the proper legal basis for it. Thus, an appellee may
argue for the first time on appeal any legal ground in support of
a judgment ....157
There are several well-noted limitations to the "right for the
wrong reason" rationale. First, it cannot be applied if the reason for
affirming the decision was not raised in any way at trial. 5 ' Second,
if further factual development is needed before the right reason can
be found to affirm the decision, the rationale is inapplicable. 59

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Driscoll v. Commonwealth, 417 S.E.2d 312, 313 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
Mason v. Commonwealth, 373 S.E.2d 603, 607 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
Blackman v. Commonwealth, 613 S.E.2d 460, 465 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
Driscoll, 417 S.E.2d at 313-14.
Id. at 313.
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Third, it may not be used when the trial court has confined its
decision to a specific ground and more facts are needed to find the
right reason."e° Fourth, the Commonwealth cannot use the rationale
as a "subterfuge for a constitutionally prohibited cross-appeal."'' 1
Whether these exceptions to the "right for the wrong reason"
rationale are going to apply to a particular case is heavily factdependent.
The "right for the wrong reason" rationale should not permit the
Commonwealth to present new theories of guilt. Under the first
limitation, the Commonwealth is required to raise the factual theory
in at least some fashion for it to be considered on appeal. If they do,
the defendant has the right and responsibility to reply to the theory.
If it is not raised, a defendant should not be required to preempt a
theory of guilt at trial. Because the facts of a criminal case are often
unclear, they can be subject to any number of interpretations.
Requiring a criminal defendant to respond to theories not presented
against her at trial would effectively require a defendant to concoct
all the possible interpretations of the facts under which she might
be found guilty, communicate them to the judge or jury, and then
present evidence and arguments against those theories while the
Commonwealth sits silently. Unfortunately, by refusing to restrict
6 2 this is the reality
the Commonwealth to its trial theory in Bolden,"
that criminal defendants face in Virginia today.
Under the second limitation, if the trial court rejected the
rationale that the Commonwealth then attempts to assert more
completely on appeal, it should be prohibited by Rules 5A:18 and
5:25.63 Therefore, if the prosecution at trial begins to assert a
theory of guilt, which is then rejected by the court, the Commonwealth should not be allowed to bring it back to life on appeal.
Although this may sound like an unlikely occurrence, comparing the
Bolden trial record' with the appellate argumentation' demonstrates how this could happen.

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 314.
Id. at 313; see also supra note 58.
654 S.E.2d 584, 586 (Va. 2008).
Driscoll, 417 S.E.2d at 313.
Transcript of Record, supra note 19, at 43.
Brief of the Commonwealth, supra note 32, at 12.
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At trial in Bolden, when one of the Commonwealth's witnesses
attempted to connect the gun to the drugs found on Bolden,
unprompted by a question from the Commonwealth's attorney,
Bolden's counsel objected and the trial court agreed with defense
counsel's interpretation of the testimony as meaning only that a gun
was found in the vehicle.166 The prosecutor then continued with his
proximity theory, never to return to the connection between guns
and drugs.'67 At this point in the trial, the trial court rejected the
theory of guilt that the Commonwealth later asserted on appeal. As
the Commonwealth pushed the theory no further at trial, and the
only testimony making the link was rejected by the trial court,
Bolden no longer needed to put on evidence or argument to disprove
this claim. On appeal, however, the Commonwealth reasserted this
theory of guilt because it was the only one that actually proved constructive possession. 6 ' By refusing to restrict the Commonwealth to
its trial court theories with its decision in Bolden,'69 the Virginia
Supreme Court has encouraged the Commonwealth to sandbag its
most incriminating theories until it is before the appellate court,
where significant procedural advantages virtually prohibit a
defendant from responding.'70 As long as a prosecutor can make a
defendant 'look guilty" enough to secure a conviction at trial, the
conviction can be upheld on appeal if the new theory asserted later
sufficiently satisfies the statutory or common law requirements.
The third and fourth limitations to the "right for the wrong
reason" rationale will only apply to new theories of guilt in very
limited circumstances. If a trial court, in pronouncing guilt, specifically states the interpretation of the facts under which the
defendant is found guilty, then the third exception to the rationale
should prohibit the Commonwealth from raising a new interpretation on appeal.' The fourth exception will only apply when the
Commonwealth attempts to perform a cross-appeal 7 2 in which it
promotes a new theory of guilt.
166. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
168. Eckhart v. Commonwealth, 281 S.E.2d 853, 855 (Va. 1981) (holding proximity is
insufficient to prove constructive possession).
169. 654 S.E.2d 584, 586 (Va. 2008).
170. See supra Part II.D.
171. Driscoll v. Commonwealth, 417 S.E.2d 312, 314 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
172. Id. at 313; see also supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
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This Note does not argue that the "right for the wrong reason"
rationale should be abolished, just that it should not be grounds for
the Commonwealth to assert new theories of guilt on appeal. The
"right for the wrong reason" rationale should be restricted to cases
like McClellan v. Commonwealth.173 In that case, McClellan was in
his car in an apartment building's parking lot when he was
approached by a police officer.17 4 This encounter eventually led to
the police officer finding a concealed weapon in the vehicle because
McClellan kept reaching for the jockey box.' 75 The trial court held
that the gun was admissible, because McCellan had been seized
based on the police officer's reasonable suspicion. 7 The court of
appeals, however, affirmed the suppression because it found that
McClellan was never seized, meaning the evidence was found
during a consensual encounter. 177 Appellate courts are able to
'"affirm the judgment of a trial court when it has reached the right
[decision] for the wrong reason,' [only] so long as the correct reason
and its factual basis [are] presented at trial.'' 78 Therefore,
"[blecause the prosecutor at trial argued there was no detention,
[the court found] that the trial court in this case was right for the
wrong reason.' 7 9 Unlike in McClellan, the prosecution in Bolden
never argued that there was constructive firearm possession
because of the drug possession.8 0 Neither the correct reason nor its
factual basis were ever presented at trial, and therefore the "right
for the wrong reason" rationale was inapplicable to Bolden's
appeal.''

173. 554 S.E.2d 699, 704 (Va. Ct. App. 2001).
174. Id. at 701.
175. Id. at 701-02.
176. Id. at 704.
177. Id.
178. Id. (quoting Driscoll v. Commonwealth, 417 S.E.2d 312, 313-14 (Va. Ct. App. 1992)).
179. Id.
180. See Transcript of Record, supra note 19, at 43-44.
181. It should be noted that the Commonwealth never argued the "right for the wrong
reason" rationale as an exception to Rule 5:25 in its brief. See Brief of the Commonwealth,
supra note 32, at 6-13.
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IV. THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM OF JUSTICE
A. Case Law
The single factor demanding that the Commonwealth present its
theory of guilt at trial, that the evidence support that theory of
guilt, and that the appellate argumentation must contain that2
18
same theory of guilt, is Virginia's adversarial system of justice.
The adversarial system relies on the parties to know their case
best and demands that they, not the judge, present the facts and
arguments on their behalf.18 3 An adversarial system requires a
litigant to present evidence at trial to establish facts, and to use
those facts to make arguments with respect to how they wish the
applicable law to apply to the facts of the case.'" Under an adversarial model, courts must respect the argumentative and strategic
choices made by attorneys, and not supplement them with their own
85
theories as to how the case should be run.'
These same principles apply in criminal trials.'8 6 Furthermore,
criminal defendants are not guaranteed that their trial counsel
will make every possible argument at trial, and failure to do so is
not considered ineffective assistance of counsel." 7 That a defense
attorney should not be reasonably expected to advance every
possible argument in her client's defense is significant because it
demonstrates that defense attorneys are not constitutionally
required to conceive of every possible theory of guilt not advanced
182. See infra notes 210-13 and accompanying text.
183. See Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Our
adversary system is designed around the premise that the parties know what is best for them,
and are responsible for advancing the facts and arguments entitling them to relief.").
184. See id.; Sanchez-lamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 357 (2006).
185. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 681 (1984) ("Because advocacy is an art
and not a science, and because the adversary system requires deference to counsel's informed
decisions, strategic choices must be respected ...."); see also Castro,540 U.S. at 386-87 (Scalia,
J., concurring) ("The injustice caused by letting the litigant's own mistake lie is regrettable,
but incomparably less than the injustice of producing prejudice through the court's
intervention.").
186. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975) ("The very premise of our adversar[ial]
system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote
the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free.").
187. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 133-34 (1982).
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at trial.1 88 The Bolden decision,189 on the other hand, requires
defense attorneys to do exactly that. 9 ° In an adversarial criminal
justice system, it is the responsibility of prosecutors to collect the
evidence, marshal the facts, and present arguments applying those
facts to the law under which a criminal defendant is being prosecuted.1 9 ' Likewise, it is the criminal defense attorney's responsibility
to "aggressively challenge[] the evidence presented by the other
side."'92 A fundamental principle of this system of criminal justice
is that a criminal defendant must be able to fully confront the
prosecution's case.'9 3 Only by forcing the Commonwealth to flesh out
its theory of guilt in open court, and therefore giving the criminal
defendant a full opportunity to rebut that theory, may a trial
perform its fact-finding function while assuring "fairness in the
adversar[ial] criminal process."' 94
A party to litigation, including the Commonwealth in criminal
cases,
voluntarily [chooses its] attorney as [its] representative in the
action, and ... cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or
omissions of this freely selected agent. Any other notion would
be wholly inconsistent with our system of representative
litigation, in which each party is deemed bound by the acts of
[her] lawyer-agent .... "'
As such, the Commonwealth should be bound by the facts and
arguments its representatives present at trial in criminal cases.
that the
Under an adversarial model, "[i]t is fundamental ...
the
best
guarantee
that a
selfish interest of the litigant provides
9
6
claim will be effectively asserted."' Judges act inappropriately
188. See id.
189. Bolden v. Commonwealth, 654 S.E.2d 584, 585-86 (Va.2008).
190. See supra text accompanying note 162.
191. See, e.g., Wheatley v. Wicomico County, 390 F.3d 328, 335 (4th Cir. 2004) ("Lawyers
have a duty not just to submit evidence, but to provide some focus [as] to their argument.").
192. Granviel v. Texas, 495 U.S. 963, 964 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
193. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 175 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("[O]ne of the hallmarks of due process in our adversary system is the defendant's ability to
meet the State's case against [her].").
194. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981).
195. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962).
196. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 62 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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when they consider arguments outside those put forth by the
litigants.'9 7 Not only does the judge lack an intricate knowledge of
the facts of the case,' 9 8 but the judge is meant to be a neutral
arbiter, not a wing of either party.' A criminal defendant is
presumed innocent, and does not have to put on evidence in her own
defense."' For a trial court to infer a theory of guilt not presented
by the prosecution is contrary to the underlying theories of the
adversarial system 0' and violates the concept that a criminal
defendant does not have to present evidence in her own defense. 0 2
If a criminal defendant had to respond to new theories of guilt
considered sua sponte by the trial court, criminal defense attorneys
would have to predict the theories swimming around in the mind of
the judge, present those arguments against their client in open
court, and then rebuff them. This scenario is such a perversion of
the adversarial model that it hardly requires refutation.
The possibility that a trial court might convict a criminal
defendant under a theory not presented is obscurely, yet essentially,
related to the Commonwealth's ability to present a new theory of
guilt on appeal. Particularly where the prosecution's trial theory
was insufficient to meet the doctrinal requirements to secure a
conviction, 0 3 an appellate court then affirming a conviction based
on a new theory sends the message not only that the trial court
could have considered that new theory, but that the court did in fact
consider it. If the trial court did not consider the theory, and simply
convicted based on the inadequate trial court presentations of the
prosecution, theoretically the conviction should be reversed.2 °4 This
197. See Eriline Co. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States
v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
198. "[Ihe party who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon ...." The
Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913).
199. See Eriline, 440 F.3d at 654; Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God&A
CriticalLook at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 TENN. L. REV. 245, 279 (2002).
200. See Dotson v. Commonwealth, 199 S.E. 471, 473 (Va. 1938).
201. See Eriline, 440 F.3d at 654.
202. See Dotson, 199 S.E. at 473.
203. This is precisely what happened in Bolden. The prosecution's trial strategy was to
argue that Bolden's proximity to the weapon proved he constructively possessed it, but under
Virginia law proximity is doctrinally insufficient to prove constructive possession. See supra
notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
204. See Kelly v. Commonwealth, 584 S.E.2d 444, 450 (Va. Ct. App. 2003) (Elder, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Archer v. Commonwealth, 492 S.E.2d 826, 832 (Va. Ct. App. 1997))
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is how the Virginia Supreme Court should have resolved Bolden, but
it did not. 20 5 By allowing the Commonwealth to present new theories
of guilt on appeal,0 6 the court in Bolden implicitly held that trial
judges may convict criminal defendants under their own interpretation of the facts. The trial judge need never make this alternate
theory available to the defendant to refute, and the Commonwealth
may then use this theory on appeal in order to supplant faulty trial
advocacy and save the case. Allowing a judge to convict a defendant
based on an unarticulated theory is not only contrary to an adversarial system of justice, but also it plainly violates the constitutional due process requirement that a defendant be afforded the
opportunity to confront the case against him.20 7
Rules 5A:18 and 5:25 prohibit an appellate court from assuming that reasons supporting a particular position "were proffered
but not made part of the record."2 The presumption that the
Commonwealth may supplement its trial court advocacy with
additional theories of guilt on appeal seems to be directly at odds
with a fundamental precept of the American adversarial system of
justice, namely that "a judge ... does not (as an inquisitor does)
conduct the factual and legal investigation himself, but instead
decides [the case] on the basis of facts and argumentspro and con
2" 9 Put simply, an appellate court should not
adduced by the parties."
be able to affirm a conviction by assuming that the trial court
considered an argument never presented, especially when the record
itself would otherwise demand reversal.2 10 This principle distinguishes adversarial and inquisitorial judicial systems, and also
paves the way for the even application of procedural default rules
that is essential to a just appellate system.2 1'
The adversarial process does not end once a trial is concluded. On
appeal, appellants are required to submit assignments of error and
(noting that theories of innocence shall not be upheld on appeal if plainly wrong).
205. Bolden v. Commonwealth, 654 S.E.2d 584, 585-87 (Va. 2008).
206. Id.
207. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 175 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
208. Lee v. Lee, 404 S.E.2d 736, 738 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (en banc).
209. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n.2 (1991) (emphasis added).
210. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
211. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 357 (2006) (citing McNeil, 501 U.S. at 181
n.2).
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supply briefs supporting those assignments, while appellees brief
their responses.21 2 Parties are then limited to those errors and
arguments as briefed when pressing their appeal.2 1 There is a clear
link between a party's responsibility to develop arguments at trial
and the appellate court's responsibility to refuse to entertain arguments not developed by fact and argument. As the Fourth Circuit
recently stated:
The adversary system cannot function properly if lawyers are
allowed to dump arguments on a ...
court at the last minute,
without developing them during the course of litigation....
[I]t is insufficient that the evidentiary basis for their ...
argument may exist somewhere in the record. An appellate court
"cannot assume the functions of a special master and roam at
large over the record, ... any attempt on its part to do so would
probably do a great deal more harm than good. 21 4
The principles of Virginia's adversarial system of justice demand
that the theory of guilt upon which the Commonwealth relies on
appeal in a criminal case must have been presented to the trial
court. 2 " A trial court acts recklessly and irresponsibly when it
assumes the Commonwealth meant to assert or insinuated a theory
of guilt that the evidence may or may not show upon close examination when that theory is not clearly espoused.2" 6 Likewise, it is
simply not the responsibility of appellate courts to scour the trial
court record looking for statements or evidence to support an
alternate theory of guilt on appeal.21 7
When the record fails to establish that a particular theory of guilt
was raised in the trial court, Rules 5A:18 and 5:25 should prevent
an appellate court from assuming that the "reasons were proffered
but not made a part of the record."21 8 Given that criminal defendants
212. See, e.g., VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:20-21; VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:27-28; VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:17(c).
213. See, e.g., Buck v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 414, 418 (Va. 1994) (Hassell, J., dissenting).
214. Wheatley v. Wicomico County, 390 F.3d 328, 335 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hutchinson
v. Fidelity Inv.Ass'n, 106 F.2d 431, 436 (4th Cir. 1939)).
215. See id.
216. See supranotes 205-09 and accompanying text.
217. See Wheatley, 390 F.3d at 335.
218. Lee v. Lee, 404 S.E.2d 736, 738 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (en banc).
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do not have the right to surprise the Commonwealth with new
evidence at trial, 219 and that Hudson prohibits criminal defendants
from presenting new theories of innocence on appeal, 220 equity,
symmetry, and basic fairness demand that the Commonwealth be
prohibited from surprising a criminal defendant with a new theory
of guilt on appeal.
B. Risks of Allowing New Theories of Guilt on Appeal
One of the most logical reasons for prohibiting the Commonwealth from presenting new theories is judicial economy. Presenting
all reasonable theories of guilt at trial reduces the burden placed
upon appellate courts. When the Commonwealth presents a new
theory on appeal, in order to effectively adjudicate the issue, the
appellate court must search the trial record to see whether the
evidence supports the new theory proposed by the Commonwealth's
brief.2 2' Like the reasons that justify rejecting new appellate
arguments by defendants, requiring prosecutors to present all
reasonable theories of guilt promotes "efficient judicial administration"22' 2 by guarding against reversals and mistrials, 223 particularly
when a court of appeals accepts a new theory, which then must be
reversed, or at a minimum, reevaluated by the Virginia Supreme
Court.224

219. In the context of a surprise argument brought on by the defendant in a criminal trial,
at which point the Commonwealth requested and received a continuance, the Virginia
Supreme Court stated:
Uncovering the truth is the paramount goal of the adversary system. All the
rules of decorum, ethics, and procedure are meant to aid the truth-finding
process. Ambush, trickery, stealth, gamesmanship, one-upsmanship, [and]
We agree
surprise have no legitimate role to play in a properly conducted trial....
with what Justice White said, writing in Williams: "The adversary system of
trial is hardly an end in itself; it is not yet a poker game in which players enjoy
an absolute right always to conceal their cards until played."
Bennett v. Commonwealth, 374 S.E.2d 303, 311 (Va. 1988) (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78, 82 (1970)).
220. Commonwealth v. Hudson, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786 (Va. 2003).
221. See, e.g., Wheatley, 390 F.3d at 335 (discussing the inadvisability of such a task for
appellate courts).
222. Lee, 404 S.E.2d at 737.
223. See Woodson v. Commonwealth, 176 S.E.2d 818, 820 (Va. 1970).
224. See, e.g., Bolden v. Commonwealth, 654 S.E.2d 584, 585-86 (Va. 2008).
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More significantly, requiring the Commonwealth to present its
strongest theories of guilt at trial discourages the Commonwealth
from sandbagging its best arguments and interpretations of the
evidence until a point where the ability of a criminal defendant to
refute them is severely limited.2 25 When the Commonwealth presents one theory of guilt at trial and then changes it on appeal, the
defendant's arguments and evidence presented at trial will be
inapplicable because they were necessarily targeted to respond to
the previous theory.2 26 In this way, the Bolden decision 22 7 allows
the Commonwealth "to play 'fast and loose' 228 with the Virginia
criminal justice system.
Allowing the Commonwealth to switch theories of guilt is particularly troubling considering that, in criminal appeals, the evidence
is viewed in the "light most favorable ... to the Commonwealth. 229
At trial, the Commonwealth's evidence must be viewed as if the
defendant is innocent until proven guilty.23 ° In contrast on appeal,
it is viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. 231 The
"light most favorable" appellate standard would make any new
Commonwealth theory of guilt appear even more incriminating than
it would have looked at trial because the facts are interpreted in a
way disadvantageous to the defendant.2 3 2 Furthermore, on appeal,
the question is not whether a defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether "any rational trier of fact" could have found
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 23 3 By combining the
"light most favorable" and the "rational trier of fact" standards, the
Commonwealth is given incredible advantages on appeal, which
could be used in combination with new theories of guilt to bolster
what might have been a questionable theory of guilt at trial.
225. See Wheatley, 390 F.3d at 335; Bennett v. Commonwealth, 374 S.E.2d 303, 311 (Va.
1988).
226. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text for an explanation of why criminal
defendants cannot postulate new arguments in response to the Commonwealth's new theories.
227. 654 S.E.2d at 586.
228. Buck v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 414, 418 (Va. 1994) (Hassell, J., dissenting).
229. Commonwealth v. Hudson, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786 (Va. 2003).
230. Dotson v. Commonwealth, 199 S.E. 471, 473 (Va. 1938).
231. Hudson, 578 S.E.2d at 786.
232. Compare id. (describing the appellate standard), with Dotson, 199 S.E. at 473
(describing the trial standard).
233. Haskins v. Commonwealth, 602 S.E.2d 402, 405 (Va. Ct. App. 2004) (quotation
omitted).
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Combining these procedural advantages with a new theory of guilt
would effectively eviscerate the burden of proof and the presumption
of innocence that are sacred to the criminal justice system.2 34 This
combination removes the requirement that the Commonwealth
prove a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt when the court
replaces the innocent until proven guilty standard at trial with a
235
"light most favorable" standard on appeal.
C. Theories of Guilt as a Matter of Law
In its brief to the Virginia Supreme Court in Bolden, the
Commonwealth suggested that, although a theory of guilt may not
have been presented at trial, a trial court should be able to consider
that theory "as a matter of law once the requisite evidence ... was
adduced at trial" if that theory exists in case law.2 36 The consequences of such a rule would gravely damage Virginia's adversarial
system. 2 37 Additionally, allowing trial courts to consider arguments
or theories sua 23sponte
would quickly spiral far beyond simple
8
theories of guilt.
Allowing judges to consider theories of guilt that exist within the
case law but not presented at trial is more than absurd and it
blatantly contradicts a defendant's due process rights.23 s If a trial
judge could convict a defendant based on an unarticulated theory,
the defendant in a criminal trial would never even hear the
arguments being used to convict her of a crime.24 ° Such an outcome
would obviously obliterate "one of the hallmarks of due process in
our adversary system[,] ... the defendant's ability to meet the State's

234. See Dotson, 199 S.E. at 473 (noting the importance of the presumption of innocence).
235. See Hudson, 578 S.E.2d at 786.
236. Brief of the Commonwealth, supra note 32, at 12; see also supra note 32.
237. See supra Part IV.B (discussing essential elements of adversarial system).
238. Some scholars have already expressed concern that "raising issues sua sponte is not
an uncommon practice." Milani & Smith, supra note 199, at 248-50.
239. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
240. This is conceivably exactly what transpired in Bolden's criminal trial. The
Commonwealth's only theory at trial was that Bolden's proximity to the weapon meant that
he possessed it. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. Despite proximity being an
insufficient basis for finding constructive possession, Jones v. Commonwealth, 439 S.E.2d 863,
864 (Va. Ct. App. 1994), the trial court convicted Bolden of possessing the firearm without
comment. Transcript of Record, supra note 19, at 46.
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case against [her]." 2 4' Convicting a defendant under such an
invisible theory would contravene the judicial mandate that "to
retain the 'general atmosphere of impartiality' required of a fair
tribunal, ... [a judge] must not-under any circumstance-become
an advocate for the prosecution."24' 2
There are a multitude of legal arguments that trial courts do not
consider sua sponte,24 3 and carving out an exclusion for theories of
guilt makes no more sense than forcing courts to inject other legal
theories into a trial when neither party has reason to resort to them.
One common example is hearsay evidence. At times, although a
party could object to hearsay evidence being offered by the opposition, that party does not object for tactical reasons.24 4 Along the
same lines, often attorneys will not request a cautionary instruction
on possibly damaging evidence to avoid drawing the jury's attention
to that evidence unnecessarily.24 In accordance with a judge's
responsibility to adjudicate and not advocate, 24 a trial court should
refrain from challenging hearsay evidence or supplying a cautionary
instruction unless it would be clear error to fail to do so. 2 47 Likewise,
a court is not required to consider a statute of limitations defense
without prompting by an attorney.24 8 When a party fails to plead the
241. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 175 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
242. United States v. Godwin, 272 F.3d 659, 678 (4th Cir. 2001).
243. See, e.g., Eriline Co. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2006) ("Sua sponte
in those narrow
consideration of a statute of limitations defense should be done sparingly ...
circumstances where it is authorized."); Commercial Distribs. v. Blankenship, 397 S.E.2d 840,
847 (Va. 1990) (refusing to decide hearsay issue sua sponte).
244. See Humphries v. Ozmint, 397 F.3d 206, 234 (4th Cir. 2005).
245. One example occurred in CommercialDistributorsv.Blankenship:
Although opposing counsel was entitled to a cautionary instruction upon
request, he was also free to wave it if he chose. As we commented in Manetta v.
Commonwealth, counsel may wish to avoid such an instruction for sound tactical
reasons. "The court [is] not required to give such an instruction sua sponte. Such
instructions may sometimes give particular emphasis to the portions of
testimony specifically mentioned by the judge, a result the parties may wish to
avoid."
397 S.E.2d at 847 (quoting Manetta v. Commonwealth, 340 S.E.2d 828, 830 n.2 (Va. 1986))
(citations omitted); see also Thomas v. Commonwealth, 607 S.E.2d 738, 743 (Va. Ct. App.
2005) (citing the adversarial system as a reason not "[tlo compel a trial judge to give a
cautionary instruction").
246. See supra notes 200-04 and accompanying text.
247. See Thomas, 607 S.E.2d at 743.
248. See, e.g., Eriline Co., 440 F.3d at 654 ("As a defense waivable by the inaction of a
party, the statute of limitations bears the hallmarks of our adversarial system of justice, a
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statute of limitations as a defense, that defense is waived.24 9
Virginia courts should treat theories of guilt in the same manner.
Indeed, theories of guilt not presented at trial should be waived on
appeal.
As with evidentiary objections and statutory defenses, a judge
should not consider a theory of guilt unless advocated by the
prosecution at trial. In an adversarial system, the Commonwealth's
attorneys are assumed to know the facts of the case and law
surrounding those facts to a greater extent than the trial judge,25 °
and to permit the judge to search the entire criminal case law for
theories of guilt not argued by the Commonwealth at trial is truly
an absurd proposition. A trial judge simply will not have the
mastery of the factual circumstances of any given case that the
prosecution and defense have.2 5 ' Furthermore, the judge will
generally lack a specific knowledge of the case law directly on point
to provide her with potential theories of guilt not presented in open
court.252

Taken to its extreme-but not illogical--conclusion, the idea that
a trial judge may consider arguments that are not made on the
record but may be inferred from the evidence adduced would render
trial attorneys irrelevant. Under such a system, the judge would be
presumed to have a complete grasp of all possibly applicable law to
any given set of facts, those facts would be presented to the trial
court in some fashion,25 3 the judge would then consider the facts
using her all-encompassing knowledge of the Commonwealth's case,
constitutional law, and statutory provisions in pronouncing a
judgment. An attorney would only be necessary on appeal to
advance theories of the evidence and the points of law that the trial
court could have considered. Conceivably, attorneys would not even
be necessary on appeal, as appellate judges could be presumed to
have the same body of knowledge as trial judges. Taken to this
system in which the parties are obliged to present facts and legal arguments before a neutral
and relatively passive decision-maker.").
249. Id. at 653-54.
250. See supra Part IV.A.
251. See Milani & Smith, supra note 199, at 278-79.
252. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
253. Conveniently for the Commonwealth, "[o]ur system of justice is, and has always been,
an inquisitorial one at the investigatory stage ....
and no other disposition is conceivable."
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n.2 (1991).
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logical extreme, "[the Commonwealth] would never be responsible
for the neglect of its ...
attorney[s]" 2" because a trial or appellate
judge could simply do their job for them. Such a regime would
"undermine the adversarial system. 2 55
Obviously the situation just described is an extreme distortion
of the adversarial model of criminal adjudication. However, this
scenario highlights the risks in removing the safeguards of the
adversarial system and replacing them with an unchecked inquisitorial authority. The Virginia Supreme Court opened the door to an
inquisitorial model in Bolden when it refused to restrict the
Commonwealth to its trial court theories of guilt.2 5 The Bolden
decision allows criminal defendants to be convicted using theories
of guilt considered sua sponte by the trial court judge, theories that
are then articulated and argued for the first time on appeal.25 7
CONCLUSION

The danger posed by a failure to extend Rules 5A:18 and 5:25 to
prevent new theories of guilt on appeal is not merely theoretical.
Although Virginia case law supports an interpretation of Rules
5A:18 and 5:25 that prohibits the Commonwealth from arguing
new theories of guilt on appeal,25 8 the lack of a clear ruling by the
Virginia Supreme Court has meant that the courts of appeals have
been unable to apply that interpretation.2 5 9 As recently as September 25, 2007, an appellate court allowed the Commonwealth to
assert a new theory of guilt on appeal.2" In that case, the court of
appeals explicitly stated that although
[t]he Commonwealth did not appear to advance exactly the same
theory of guilt at trial as it [did] on appeal, ... Rule 5A: 18 applies
only to rulings of the trial court offered on appeal as a basis for
reversal, and we are aware of no authority to prevent an
254. Smith v. Bounds, 813 F.2d 1299, 1304 (4th Cir. 1987).
255. Id.
256. Bolden v. Commonwealth, 654 S.E.2d 584, 586 (Va. 2008).
257. See supra Part I.
258. See supra Part IIA.
259. See supra Part II.C.
260. Franklin v. Commonwealth, No. 09868-06-2, 2007 WL 2766197, at *6 (Va. Ct. App.
Sept. 25, 2007).
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appellee from raising a previously unexpressed theory of guilt on
which the trial court may have relied.2 1
The essential fairness of every criminal trial and appeal is at
risk in Virginia. In Commonwealth v. Hudson,the Virginia Supreme
Court rightfully reaffirmed that a criminal defendant is restricted
to the theories of innocence that he argued at trial.26 2 It is time for
the supreme court to rebalance the scales of justice and grant
criminal defendants the same right to confront all legal theories and
arguments for the first time at trial that the court grants to both
parties in civil appeals and to the Commonwealth in criminal cases.
Alternatively, in the event that current Virginia case law does not
require new theories of guilt to be prohibited by Rules 5A:18 and
5:25, the Virginia Supreme Court should take the first opportunity
it has to correct this injustice by reversing the holding in Bolden and
expressly stating that the Commonwealth may not argue new
theories of guilt on appeal in criminal trials. Only the adversarial
system hangs in the balance.
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